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Abstract : This paper investigates the determinants of the prices of branded
prescription medicines across different regulatory settings and health care
systems, taking into account their launch date, patent status, market dynamics
and the regulatory context in which they diffuse. By using volume-weighted
price indices, this paper analyzes price levels for a basket of prescription
medicines and their differences in 15 OECD countries, including the United
States and key European countries, the impact of distribution margins and
generic entry on public prices and to what extent innovation, by means of
introducing newer classes of medicines, contributes to price formation across
countries. In doing so, the paper seeks to understand the factors that
contribute to the existing differences in prices across countries, whether at an
ex-factory or a retail level. The evidence shows that retail prices for branded
prescription medicines in the United States are higher than those in key
European and other OECD countries, but not as high as widely thought.
Large differences in prices are mainly observed at an ex-factory level, but these
are not the prices that consumers and payers pay. Cross-country differences in
retail prices are actually not as high as expected and, when controlling for
exchange rates, these differences can be even smaller. Product age has a
significant effect on prices in all settings after having controlled for other
factors. Price convergence is observed across countries for newer prescription
medicines compared with older medicines. There is no evidence that originator
brand prices fall after generic entry in the United States, a phenomenon known
as the ‘generics paradox’. Finally, distribution and taxes are important
determinants of retail prices in several of the study countries. To the extent
that remuneration of the distribution chain and taxation are directly and
proportionately linked to product prices this is likely to persist over time.
*Correspondence to: Panos G. Kanavos, LSE Health, Cowdray House, London School of Economics,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: p.g.kanavos@lse.ac.uk
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1. Background
Cross-country variations in the prices of prescription medicines have attracted
considerable interest in recent years, both in the policy and the peer review
literature. Recent empirical evidence suggests that significant pharmaceutical
price differences exist between the United States and other countries (Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO), 2005, 2008), and that prices of patented pre-
scription medicines are higher in the United States than in Canada or Europe.
A study researching this became available in 1998 by the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight of the US House of Representatives as a
minority staff report, reporting that drug prices in the United States were 72%
higher than in Canada and 102% higher than in Mexico. Two earlier studies by
the US General Accounting Office (GAO) using data from 1992 concluded that
US prices were 32% higher than prices in Canada and 60% higher than the
prices in the United Kingdom (GAO, 1995, 1996). In the United Kingdom, the
Department of Health submits regular reports to Parliament, which, among
other things, provide a comparison of UK prices with those in other OECD
countries, as part of the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS); in the
2009 PPRS report to Parliament, it was shown that US prices are 93% higher
than German prices and 112% higher than UK prices in 2008 at constant
exchange rates (Department of Health, 2009).
Further empirical evidence from the peer review literature points at methodo-
logical issues of cross-national price comparisons and confirms price differences
across countries (Department of Health, 1997; Danzon and Chao, 2000a; Danzon
and Towse, 2003; Danzon and Furukawa, 2003, 2008). Research has examined
factors such as price controls and patent policy affecting launch dates of new
pharmaceuticals among developed countries (Desiraju et al., 2004; Kyle, 2007;
Danzon et al., 2005; Danzon and Furukawa, 2008) and developing countries
(Lanjouw, 2005).
The evidence on whether US prices are higher than prices outside the United
States is, nevertheless, conflicting at times and is dependent on the mix of
products used, the methods applied to compare their prices and the time period
chosen. Danzon and Furukawa (2008), for instance, show that European
countries’ prices were 6–33% lower than US prices, whereas the CBO, in a
recent study, showed that prices of pharmaceutical products could be lower in
the United States than in major European countries (CBO, 2005); this latter
finding was also supported by Kanavos et al. (2007). Roughead et al. (2007)
found that Australian prices for medicines that represent significant clinical
advances were similar to those paid under key US programs, despite funda-
mental differences in the two countries’ policy contexts, a finding which is also
confirmed by an earlier study (Australian Productivity Commission, 2001). In
the United Kingdom, the 2009 PPRS report to Parliament highlighted that
although the 2008 weighted index of UK prices was significantly below than
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those in the United States, this difference may have been exacerbated by
exchange rate movements over time (Department of Health, 2009). Danzon and
Chao (2000a), however, suggest that certain studies comparing prices among the
United States and other countries may be biased by unrepresentative samples
and unweighted indexes and use Laspeyres price indices to compare cross-
country wholesale pharmaceutical prices.
The entire discussion about price levels in the United States vs Europe and
Canada has triggered intense debate about whether American patients might
benefit from lower prices for prescription medicines and whether products
should be subject to re-importation instead, thus by-passing the higher prices of
locally sourced products. One corollary of these empirical studies is that the
United States could be paying a disproportionately high share of global phar-
maceutical R&D (McClellan, 2003), although this has been challenged else-
where (Light and Lexchin, 2005; Light, 2009).
The above raise questions about the factors that contribute to or determine
cross-country pharmaceutical price variability. Although a considerable body of
empirical literature exists on cross-national differences in the prices of pre-
scription medicines, and a stream of literature has emerged in the past few years
on the factors that determine prices in individual countries, little evidence exists
on the determinants of pharmaceutical prices across different regulatory set-
tings. In addition, the literature does not fully explore the effect that factors such
as competition pre- and post-patent expiry, the type of price regulation, the age
of product and the type of cross-country price differences put together might
have on cross-country price differences in prescription medicines.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of originator
branded prescription medicine prices across different regulatory settings and
health care systems, taking into account their launch date, patent status, market
dynamics and the regulatory context in which they diffuse. In particular, this
paper analyzes price levels for a basket of prescription medicines and their
differences in 15 OECD countries (United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Greece,
Slovakia and Belgium), the impact of distribution margins and generic entry on
public prices and to what extent innovation, by means of introducing newer
classes of medicines, contributes to price formation across countries. In doing
so, this paper seeks to understand the factors that contribute to the existing
differences in prices across countries, whether at an ex-factory or a retail level.
The paper contributes to the debate on cross-national differences in the prices
of prescription medicines and their determinants in a number of ways: first,
methodologically, individual country volume-weighted price indices are used
to compare the prices of the basket of products across countries. Second,
the analysis focuses only on originator prescription medicines (both patent-
protected and patent-expired), thus recognizing that the dynamics of price
determinants are different when generic medicines enter the market place; third,
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it provides a holistic approach to the determinants of prices, including compe-
tition pre- and post-patent, the impact of supply-side regulation, product age,
exchange rate variability and sales attrition due to switch to other products.
Fourth, the analysis is conducted over time rather than at a single point in time,
thus allowing for dynamics. Finally, the basis of analysis is public prices of
branded prescription medicines, which are paid for by health insurers, rather
than list prices, which are often artificial prices.
Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework in which this analysis takes
place. Section 3 outlines the data and methods employed in the analysis.
Following that, section 4 presents the results of the analysis, whereas section 5
discusses the key trends that are emerging. Finally, section 6 draws the main
conclusions.
2. Conceptual framework
The factors that influence pricing and the prices of prescription medicines are
complex and have been investigated within the context of both pre-patent and
post-patent expiry. Economic theory suggests that in regular markets, increasing
entry and the resulting competition or the threat of entry may lead to lower
prices. An important corollary is that when a second player enters a monopoly
market, prices will drop. This is not necessarily the case in pharmaceutical
markets. Factors influencing the nature of competition in pharmaceutical mar-
kets include the effect of patent protection, patent expiry, advertising, pur-
chasing by third-party payers and price or volume regulation.
An important potential determinant of pricing and of prices of prescription
medicines relates to market developments post-patent expiry. Empirical evi-
dence from the United States suggests that generic entry leads to higher origi-
nator prices and that a necessary condition for such price increases is that
generic entry leads to a decline in the own-price elasticity of reduced-form
brand-name demand (Frank and Salkever, 1997), a phenomenon known as the
‘generics paradox’. Further empirical evidence from the United States suggests
that innovator firms do not attempt to deter generic entry through their pricing
strategies and this may lead to a significant reduction in market share of the
originator drug post generic entry (Grabowski and Vernon, 1986, 1996; CBO,
1998); empirical evidence from Canada shows similar results (Lexchin, 2004).
Rather, innovator firms have continued to increase their prices at the same rate
as before generic entry. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2005) found that originator
brand prices do not decrease prices after generic entry, whereas Caves et al.
(1991) concluded that generic entry only leads to a slowdown in the increase of
originator drug prices. Danzon and Chao (2000a) showed that generic com-
petition would lower prices in less-regulated regimes, whereas Kanavos et al.
(2008) suggested that regulation in pharmaceutical markets would result in
prices of generic medicines not declining fast enough.
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Advertising and advertising intensity also influence the choice of pharma-
ceutical products in an environment of product differentiation pre-patent expiry,
where products are considered to be broadly comparable at the therapeutic class
level, or substitutes. Empirical evidence suggests that advertising, by means of
detailing, has a powerful effect and systematically lowers price sensitivity
because it increases brand loyalty, in addition to the effect of increasing a
product’s sales (Rizzo, 1999; Berndt et al., 2007), as well as having spillover
effects, such that advertising by one firm in a therapeutic category increases
demand for other drugs in the same category (Berndt et al., 1995).
A further important aspect that affects pharmaceutical prices is regulation of
pharmaceutical markets. Recent studies have emphasized the importance of
pharmaceutical regulation whether on the supply or the demand side (Kanavos
and Costa-Font, 2005; Kanavos et al., 2008). Regulation includes interventions
on price through a variety of administrative measures, including the imposition of
price ceilings, the adoption of price cuts, as well as methods such as cost-plus
pricing, external price referencing and cost-effectiveness pricing. Assessing the
relative costs and benefits of new medicines in relation to existing alternatives has
been increasing in influence in recent years as part of enabling policy-makers to
reach informed decisions on the value of a new product and, through that on its
price, based on clinical and cost evidence (Sorenson et al., 2008; Kanavos et al.,
2010, 2011a). Similarly, the uptake and use of external price referencing has
increased considerably over the past two decades as a means of restricting prices
in a particular country to those selected from other countries (Espin et al., 2010).
Some studies suggest that countries with strict price regulation of originator,
in-patent pharmaceuticals have lower prices than countries with less strict
regulation (Jo¨nsson, 1994). Yet, it is not always clear what the effect of regu-
lated or unregulated prices is on the overall cost of pharmaceutical products, as
volume must be accounted for. Recent findings indicate that the use of price
controls, including external price referencing, has a statistically and quantita-
tively important effect on the extent and timing of the launch of new drugs and
that price regulation in one country affects entry into other countries, and may
affect the strategies of domestic firms (Kyle, 2007). In addition, imposing price
ceilings in regulated markets may even lower the price in unregulated markets
(Mujumdar and Pal, 2005).
Internal reference pricing, one form of reimbursement regulation affecting
predominantly products or therapeutic classes characterized by patent expiries,
has attracted considerable attention in the last 15 years (Aaserud et al., 2009);
in the Swedish context it has been shown to lead to a decrease in the market
shares of particular originator products, suggesting higher levels of competi-
tion (Aronsson et al., 2001). Grootendorst and Stewart (2006) drawing upon
evidence from British Columbia found that the daily cost of drugs declined
following the introduction of reference pricing, but part of this reduction could
be attributed to factors other than reference pricing.
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Some studies have concluded that competition has kept prices low in markets
with less regulation, particularly in markets with patent-expired drugs. At least
three studies provide empirical evidence that generic competition is more effective
in such countries (Danzon and Chao, 2000a; Magazzini et al., 2004; Kanavos
et al., 2008). Nevertheless, Danzon and Chao (2000a) state that comparing prices
of pharmaceutical products across countries gives uncertain results due to the
differences in products, prices and volumes. On the basis of empirical evidence
from Norway, the introduction of a price index that aimed in lowering entry
barriers actually helped increase the market shares of generics and helped trigger
price competition by reducing overall market power (Dalen et al., 2006). This
policy measure may offer consumers the alternative of cheaper generics and,
therefore, help reduce spending. At times, the presence of regulation, for instance,
in the form of a price index used in price setting, may indeed skew the market,
leading to different effects than what would happen in the absence of regulation.
Age, measured from the point of launching a new prescription medicine,1 is
also an important determinant of its price and may capture two effects; the first
relates to the innovative potential of the new medicine in relation to existing
therapeutic alternatives, such that if new medicines or classes of medicines
display improvements in their clinical profile compared with existing ones, they
will be priced at a price premium compared with those alternatives. Some
regulatory authorities have mechanisms whereby the innovative potential of
new medicines is captured (O¨BIG, 2007). It would be reasonable to assume that
innovation leads to higher prices. However, Berndt et al. (1992) found no evi-
dence that product age had any impact on price indexes, but Danzon and Chao
(2000b) found a steeper decline of price with drug age in regulated markets. The
second effect is the product life-cycle effect and postulates that drug sales follow
a life-cycle pattern, increasing during a drug’s initial years on the market,
peaking and, eventually, declining; some evidence of that exists in the literature
and concerns the anti-hypertensive market (Rizzo, 1999), but is unknown
whether it can be applied across the entire pharmaceutical market.
On the basis of the existing literature and in order to study the determinants of
originator branded prescription medicines, we consider a price determination
function that aims to explain prices across different settings. In particular, origi-
nator brand prices are set by profit-maximizing firms, taking the effects of com-
petition, both pre- and post-patent expiry, regulation and the environment they sell
in into consideration. This price determination function is depicted in equation (1):
P ¼ f ðA;L;C; S;RÞ ð1Þ
where price, P, is a function of the product’s age, A, the life-cycle effects, L, the
nature of competition, whether pre- or post-patent, C, the overall cross-country
differences, S, and the nature of regulation and its intensity in individual markets, R.
1 The concept of a ‘new’ prescription medicine includes products that could be combinations of two
old drugs or a new formulation of an old drug, provided that additional therapeutic benefit can be shown.
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3. Data and methods
3.1 Data
Pricing (both at an ex-factory and a retail level) and sales data for the 50 leading
originator branded prescription-only products by their worldwide sales and for
each of 2004 and 2007 were used in this analysis, that is, a total of 100 branded
products for the two years. The price data for these products were collected from
national official sources, whereas sales were acquired from Intercontinental
Medical Statistics (IMS). This paper included 15 OECD countries, notably the
United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia,
Mexico, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Slovakia and Belgium.
The study countries were selected, first, on the basis of the size of their
pharmaceutical market, ensuring a balance between large markets and smaller
markets. The 10 largest markets included in the study sample accounted for
80% of global prescription drug sales. A second criterion was geographical
location (Europe, North America, Japan and Australia), whereas a third cri-
terion was the variety of regulatory regimes for prescription medicines reflecting
different priorities in supply-side policies; the sample includes countries carrying
out value assessments and negotiating pharmaceutical prices (e.g. France,
Sweden, Belgium, Australia, Italy and Japan), countries where pricing is by and
large free (United States and Germany), countries having value assessments
combined with rate of return regulation (United Kingdom), or countries with
minimal intervention (Mexico) and countries that pursue an administrative
control of pharmaceutical prices (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Slovakia and Austria).
A summary of key policies affecting prices of originator pharmaceuticals in the
study countries is provided in Table 1.
The selected sample of 100 products (50 products each for 2004 and 2007)
comprised a total of 68 unique molecules for both 2004 and 2007; 32 of these
molecules were common for 2004 and 2007, whereas 18 molecules were unique
for 2004 and a further 18 were unique for 2007. These 68 molecules were
drawn from across 19 therapeutic categories. On the basis of their three-digit
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification (three-digit), the 13 key
therapeutic classes were (a) proton pump inhibitors grouped with ranitidine (five
molecules); (b) statins (four molecules); (c) calcium antagonists and metoprolol
(four molecules); (d) Angiotensin Converting Enzyme (ACE) inhibitors (one
molecule); (e) sartans (three molecules); (f) opioids (two molecules); (g) anti-epileptics
(three molecules); (h) atypical anti-psychotics (five molecules); (i) Alzheimer’s
(two molecules); (j) anti-depressants (four molecules); (k) biguanides (three
molecules); (l) anti-bacterials for systemic use (five molecules); (m) drugs for
obstructive airway diseases (five molecules); and (n) molecules from other
therapeutic categories (22 molecules). The 13 leading therapeutic categories in
the sample accounted for 67.65% of the molecules and over 78.81% of sales
(measured in public prices) in 2007.
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Table 1. Key features of National Drug Policies, 2004 and 2007
Flexible distribution
margins1
Socialized health
insurance system2
Health technology
assessment3
Internal reference
pricing
Free
pricing4
External price
referencing5
2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Australia | | | | | |
Austria | | | |
Belgium | | | | | | |
France | | | |
Germany | | | | | |
Greece | | | |
Italy | | | | | |
Japan | | | | | |
Mexico | | | | |6 |6
Portugal | | | | | |
Slovakia | | | | | |
Spain | | | | | |
Sweden | | | | | |
United Kingdom | | | | | | | |
United States | | | |
1The other study countries have regulated distribution margins.
2As a means of coverage for the majority of the population.
3Explicitly used in the decision-making process.
4For new products; in the United Kingdom, although there is a rate of return regulation, pricing of medicines is in principle free.
5Applies in the majority of countries, mostly by defining a basket of countries taken as reference; usually, the average or the lowest of the basket are taken to be the bench-
mark price in the country in question. Frequencies of update differ, but they are usually annual (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Mexico and Portugal), or occur only at launch
(Italy, Spain, France and Slovakia). In France, Italy and Japan prices from the reference countries are used indirectly to inform the pricing process, whereas in all other coun-
tries they are used explicitly. European Union (EU) countries’ basket typically includes other EU countries; Mexico’s basket comprises six countries where the product in
question enjoys the highest sales penetration. In Japan, the basket of countries includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France.
6Owing to the way the system operates in Mexico, it is a combination of free pricing with international price comparisons with validation from countries that have the
highest penetration for the product under consideration.
Source: The authors.
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These inclusion criteria resulted in more than 50% coverage of the total phar-
maceutical market in the study countries. The study countries also accounted for
over 82% of the worldwide pharmaceutical market according to IMS.
Several of the originator brands in both 2004 and 2007 had already faced
patent expirations and generic entry. In particular, 28 brands in 2004 and 32
brands in 2007 were off-patent in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy and Spain. Of the 22 brands that were patent protected in 2004, 13
were also patent protected in 2007. Although a number of the originator brands
in the sample were patent-expired, the objective of this paper was not to study
the prices or the price evolution of generics.
In order to ensure direct product comparability across countries, the most
selling pack for each originator brand was identified and formed the basis for the
calculation of an ex-factory and retail price indices. Due consideration was
exercised so that the dosage was common for each product across the sample of
countries. On average, the most selling pack represented 49% of the total brand
sales in the study countries and in some cases it exceeded 80% of total brand
sales. A price index approach was used to arrive at a country-specific composite
price for the selected product basket.
Both ex-factory and retail prices were used to study the retail segment, spe-
cifically only products dispensed in the outpatient market. Product price data
were obtained from national official sources (see Table A1 in the Appendix),
whereas sales data for each corresponding product were obtained from IMS.
Prices were taken for the first quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2007.
Prices were adjusted for defined daily dose (DDD), as defined by the World
Health Organization (2008). Prices studied reflect the products’ dispensing cost,
regardless of whether health insurance covers the entire cost, or the patient has
to pay a co-payment.
The retail prices in this paper reflect prices actually paid by health insurers,
although it is not possible to capture any rebates given to public insurance bodies
on an ex-post basis. As we are studying originator brand prices only, it is thought
that the effect of such rebates on prices is small and that where they exist they
affect generic products predominantly (Kanavos et al., 2009). In the United States,
prices from the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) are used. FSS is a multiple award,
multi-year federal contract that is available for use by any Federal Government
agency and satisfies all Federal contract laws and regulations. Pricing is negotiated
based on how vendors do business with their commercial customers and, there-
fore, reflects discounting practices elsewhere in the system. FSS prices do not
capture the uninsured, who pay considerably higher prices.
3.2 The empirical model
In order to empirically test the impact of different variables on the prices of
prescription drugs we built an econometric model and applied panel data analysis.
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The panel ID was therefore the molecule and the time variable was the year (one
observation in 2004 and one in 2007). On the basis of equation (1), the estimated
models are in equations (2) and (3):
PPi;t ¼ bi þ b0 þ b1agei;t þ b2agesq þ b3genericsi;t þ b4usi;t þ b5uki;t þ b6mexi;t
þ b7xri;t þ b8htai;t þ b9rpi;t þ b10fpi;t þ b11epr þ b12classi;t þ i;t ð2Þ
PEFi;t ¼bi þ b0 þ b1agei;t þ b2agesq þ b3genericsi;t þ b4usi;t þ b5uki;t þ b6mexi;t
þb7xri;t þ b8htai;t þ b9rpi;t þ b10fpi;t þ b11epr þ b12classi;t þ ui;t ð3Þ
where i indicates the specific product in a specific country and t indicates time.
PP is the log of the retail price and PEF is the log of the ex-factory price, adjusted
for DDD. Both ex-factory and retail prices were expressed in euros by using the
end-of-year exchange rate for 2004 and 2007, respectively. The use of exchange
rates to convert prices in different currencies into a common currency is justified
by the fact that they reflect price movements across traded goods, including
pharmaceuticals, compared with purchasing power parities (PPPs), which are
better suited to account for cross-country differences of non-tradables, such as
health care services (Kanavos and Mossialos, 1999). age is the number of years
since the product’s launch in a local market. It is determined as the number of
years (non-integral values) since the launch of each brand in each of the study
countries. agesq is the square of the age term and is included to allow for the
possibility that sales will eventually decline with the number of years on the
market, due to switch to other products. In doing so, it has been hypothesized
that drug sales would follow a life-cycle pattern. generics is a 0–1 dummy
variable which indicates the presence of generic competitors for the particular
molecule or not and is benchmarked against patent expiry for each brand and
for each of the study countries. Positive sales of a generic product indicate
generic presence. This will show the effect of generic entry and presence on
originator prices. us, uk and mex are country dummy variables for the United
States, the United Kingdom and Mexico, respectively, which are included to
account for potential differences in prices in these countries compared with the
other study countries arising from differences in (a) the way prescription med-
icines are priced (free pricing in the United States, free pricing subject to rate of
return regulation in the United Kingdom and free pricing subject to validation
from countries with the highest product penetration in Mexico2) and (b) dis-
tribution systems, whereby distribution arrangements in most countries remu-
narate wholesalers and pharmacists on the basis of fixed negotiated margins,
except for the United States, the United Kingdom and Mexico, where flexible
margin policies exist. xr is a control variable capturing the effect of exchange
rate movements. As prices are expressed in euros, xr is used to control for
2 Which is distinct from both free pricing and external price referencing.
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changes in the exchange rates and captures price movements attributable to
exchange rate movements and volatility rather than nominal changes in prices.
A number of regulatory dummy variables were also added to the model in order
to determine the impact of regulation on prices. The impact of Health Technology
Assessment (HTA) as a means of influencing prices is captured by the variable hta.
HTA is explicitly used to inform pricing decisions in Australia, France, Belgium
(only in 2007), Sweden and the United Kingdom. rp indicates the presence of
internal reference pricing as a regulatory measure. This is present in Australia,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Slovakia. fp indicates free
pricing for pharmaceuticals, present in Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States and indicates the absence of explicit regulatory
intervention to set prices administratively. epr indicates the presence and explicit use
of external price referencing in price setting in Spain, Austria, Portugal, Greece,
Slovakia and Belgium. class indicates a dummy variable for each therapeutic class;
the definition of therapeutic classes was based on diagnosis and the three-digit ATC
classification. A definition and description of all variables is shown in Table 2.
In estimating equations (2) and (3), we have used random effects panel data
analysis. The Hausman test suggests that it is preferable to follow the random
effects approach because the x2 statistic is 0.49, indicating that the difference
between the consistent fixed effects and the random effects estimator is statistically
insignificant. The random effects approach assumes that the intercepts of the
individual variables are different but that they can be treated as drawings from a
distribution with mean m and variance sa
2. The essential assumption here is that
these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables (Verbeek, 2005).
4. Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis: price comparisons across countries
An analysis of cross-country price differences reveals interesting results, which
are summarized in Figures 1–5. A sub-sample of the study countries has been
used to highlight the points raised in Figures 1–5, as all others usually follow
pricing developments in the highlighted countries. In order to compare prices
across countries, country-based (weighted) price indices have been created, both
for ex-factory and for public prices, the latter reflecting prices paid for by health
insurers. Clearly, weights vary across countries in order to reflect local market
share patterns. The price index we have created takes into account product
market shares in each country, but not absolute levels of consumption, as the
latter would bias the results, leading to higher prices for countries with higher
drug consumption. For this purpose, the weights used are volume-adjusted on a
country-by-country basis; to that end, each drug’s (volume-based) market share
is taken into account in building a country’s price index. For the calculations
shown in Figures 1–5, the weighted average in the five largest European Union
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Table 2. Variable definition and summary statistics
Variable Definition Observations Mean s.e.
PP Officially published public prices for the first quarter of 2004
and the first quarter of 2007, adjusted for DDD, as defined
by the World Health Organization; in logs
1082 0.661 1.035
PEF Officially published ex-factory prices for the first quarter
of 2004 and the first quarter of 2007, adjusted for DDD, as
defined by the World Health Organization; in logs
1197 0.386 1.081
age Number of years since molecule’s launch in the local market.
Determined as number of years (non-integral values) from the
first date for which sales data were positive in each country
1214 11.125 8.943
generics 0–1 dummy variable. 1 if there is a generic competitor
present in the market; 0 if not
1232 0.408 0.492
us Dummy variable for United States; 1 for United States;
0 for all other countries
1300 0.077 0.267
uk Dummy variable for United Kingdom; 1 for United Kingdom;
0 for all other countries
1200 0.083 0.277
mex Dummy variable for Mexico; 1 for Mexico; 0 for all other
countries
1200 0.083 0.277
hta Dummy variable indicating the impact of Health Technology
Assessment being explicitly used as a policy measure. 1 for
Australia, Belgium (2007 only), Sweden, France and the
United Kingdom; 0 for all other countries
1206 0.250 0.433
rp Dummy variable. Indicates the presence of reference pricing.
1 in Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Portugal and Slovakia; 0 in all other countries
1206 0.500 0.500
fp Dummy variable. Indicates the presence of free pricing.
1 for Germany, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, United Kingdom
and United States; 0 for all other countries
1206 0.457 0.498
epr Dummy variable. Indicates the explicit use of external price
referencing. 1 for Spain, Mexico, Austria, Portugal,
Greece, Slovakia and Belgium; 0 for all other countries
1206 0.626 0.484
xr Exchange rate; local currency converted to euros, end of year
exchange rate for 2004 and 2007; in logs
1300 20.869 1.554
A2B1 Dummy variable indicating Therapeutic Class A2B
proton-pump inhibitors: esomeprazole, lansoprazole,
omeprazole, pantoprazole, rabeprazole and ranitidine)
1300 0.085 0.278
C10A1 Therapeutic Class C10A (statins: atorvastatin, pravastatin,
rosuvastatin and simvastatin)
1300 0.072 0.259
C8C1 Therapeutic Class C8C (calcium antagonists and metoprolol:
amplodipine, amlodipine and beanzapril combination,
metoprolol and nifedipine)
1300 0.060 0.238
C9A1 Therapeutic Class C9A (ace inhibitors: lisinopril) 1300 0.008 0.087
C9C1 Therapeutic Class C9C (sartans: candesartan, losartan
and valsartan)
1300 0.052 0.223
N2A1 Therapeutic Class N2A (opioids: fentanyl patch) 1300 0.040 0.196
N3A1 Therapeutic Class N3A (anti-epileptics: gabapentin,
lamotrigine and topiramate)
1300 0.040 0.196
N5A1 Therapeutic Class N5A (antipsychotics: aripiprazole,
olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone and risperidone consta)
1300 0.080 0.271
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(EU) countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain), grouped
together as ‘EU G5’ are taken as a base.
A comparison of ex-factory and public price levels between the United States
and EU G5 between 2004 and 2007 suggests that ex-factory price differences
appear to be very large between United States and Europe in both 2004 and
2007; public price differences, however, are significantly smaller (Figure 1). The
difference in ex-factory prices between the United States and Europe is over
200% in 2007, whereas the same difference for public prices was 24% in 2004
and 63% in 2007 and is shown to be even smaller between the United States on
the one side and the United Kingdom or Germany on the other. Price differences
appear to have increased in 2007 compared with 2004.
An important aspect when comparing prices across countries is related to
exchange rate variability. Exchange rate fluctuations may have a significant
impact on ex-factory and public prices across countries. US ex-factory prices
have increased by 19% compared with European prices between 2004 and 2007
for the sample basket. Exchange rate fluctuations have contributed to this dif-
ference by about a third (or 32%); US public prices, have risen faster (31%).
Between 2004 and 2007, US ex-factory prices have increased by 11% com-
pared with European prices for 13 branded, in-patent products on the market;
this rises to 22% if exchange rate changes are taken into account; US public
prices for the same products have risen faster than G5 public prices (114% or
Table 2. (Continued)
Variable Definition Observations Mean s.e.
N6D1 Therapeutic Class N6D (Alzheimer disease: donepezil
and galantamine)
1300 0.028 0.164
N6A1 Therapeutic Class N6A (antidepressants: escitalopram,
paroxetine, sertraline and venlafaxine)
1300 0.060 0.238
A10B Therapeutic Class A10B (metformin, pioglitazone
and rosiglitazone)
1206 0.047 0.212
J01 Therapeutic Class J01 (amoxocyllin/clavulanic acid,
ceftriaxone, azithromycin, clarithromycin, ciprofloxacine
and levofloxacine)
1206 0.050 0.218
R03 Therapeutic Class R03 (salmeterol/fluticasone, budesonide,
fluticason, triotropium bromide, and montelukast)
1206 0.085 0.278
other1 Drugs which do not belong to other therapeutic classes
used as dummies2
1206 0.293 0.455
DDD5defined daily dose.
1Based on the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system.
2Ondansetron, clopidogrel, carvedilol, valsartan and hydrochlorothiazide combination, ezetimide and
simvastatin combination, sildenafil, fluconazole, cyclosporin, diclofenac, rofecoxib, alendronic acid,
sodium residronate, zolpidem, bupropion (zyban), cetirizine, fexofenadine, loratadine, ezetimibe,
sumatriptan, valaciclovir and terbinafine.
Source: The authors.
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126% taking into account exchange rate movements), but this is largely due to
the depreciation of the US dollar compared with sterling or the euro. Ex-factory
prices of brands whose patent has expired have risen faster in the United States
than in Europe between 2004 and 2007 (158% or 175% if exchange rate
changes are considered); public prices have also risen faster in the United States
than in EU G5 (194% or 114% if exchange rate changes are considered).
Second, off-patent drugs are widely perceived as cost containment targets. Yet, the
way the off-patent segment performs differs across countries. European countries
typically regulate reimbursement; an important component of reimbursement policy
is internal reference pricing (either at molecular or/and therapeutic class level),
which, in addition to capturing competition and price decreases among generics, it
can also lead to downward pressure of off-patent originator brands. This is not
necessarily the case in the United States where generic competition can lead to a
steep decline in generic prices, but can leave off-patent originator brands unaffected.
This is captured in Figure 2, which highlights the price spread between the United
States and some of the other study countries for both in-patent and off-patent drugs.
Prices of in-patent brands increased in the United States by 13% compared with EU
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Figure 1. Price levels United States vs European Union (EU) countries United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Italy and Spain (EU G5): ex-factory and public prices at current exchange
rates, 2004 and 2007, price indices
FSS5 federal supply schedule.
Note: For the United States, the wholesaler acquisition cost is taken into account.
Source: The authors.
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G5 between 2004 and 2007 (panels a and b). However, the spread is significantly
higher in the case of originator brands whose patents expired in 2007 compared
with 2004 (94% increase between 2004 and 2007) suggesting a divergence in
policies between the United States and EU G5 or other countries (panels c and d). It
also highlights the existence of the generics paradox in the United States namely that
the prices of off-patent brands in the sample seem to be increasing in 2007 rather
than decreasing, compared with 2004.
Third, it is important to stress that distribution margins and taxes are critical
components of pharmaceutical expenditure and can generate a distortion when
comparing prices internationally. In some countries the combined effect of VAT,
wholesale and retail margins is significantly higher than in others, impacting the
proportion of the retail price directed to manufacturers. Figure 3 helps highlight
how distribution margins and VAT impact final (retail) prices in EU G5. The
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Figure 2. Public prices for branded in-patent and off-patent drugs at current exchange rates,
2004 and 2007, price indices
FSS5 federal supply schedule.
Note: This figure shows price developments across the 32 drugs that are common for both
2004 and 2007. The 32 drugs considered in 2004 are all patent-protected. Of these 32, 19
had their patents expired in 2007, whereas the remaining 13 were still patent-protected.
Therefore, panels a and b consider price developments of the 13 in-patent brands that
retained their patents in both 2004 and 2007, whereas panels c and d show price
developments in the 19 brands that lost their patent protection in 2007.
Source: The authors.
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difference in ex-factory prices for the most selling 50 originator brand prices
between Germany and the United Kingdom in 2007 was 12%. When comparing
retail prices though, this difference increases to 40%. The findings are similar for
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Germany / UK EFP spread = 12% Germany / UK PP spread = 40%
Figure 3. Public vs ex-factory prices: price levels in the G5 – prices for the top-selling
50 brands, 2007
Note: This figure considers the entire basket of branded products for 2007 (n550). EFP Index,
G55100; wholesale price5price that pharmaceutical companies charge directly to the local
wholesalers (excl. VAT). PP Index, G55100; retail price5pharmacy selling price (incl. VAT).
Source: The authors.
Figure 4. Therapeutic class (and class age) and international price differences; price spread
across therapeutic classes by class age and first introduction, 2007
Note: Classes of products are listed from left to right taking into account each product’s date
of first introduction within each class.
Source: The authors.
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Spain, France and Italy. UK retail prices are now lowest (compared with being the
second highest at ex-factory level), as the impact of distribution margins and taxes
has had a significant upward effect on retail prices in France Italy and Spain.
Fourth, age of the therapeutic class may help explain international price
differences. Figure 4 shows the average price per therapeutic class ranked by
launch date. Prices in 2007 are considered for EU G5, United States, Mexico,
Japan and Australia, across 10 key therapeutic classes. There appears to be a
significant positive correlation between the age of the therapeutic class and price
differences. The longer the therapeutic class has been on the market, the greater
are the price differences between highest and lowest prices. This figure shows
that there are smaller price differences across countries for new drugs and that,
overall, there appears to be some price convergence over time across major
countries. In some price-regulated countries, this could partly be explained by
the use of external price referencing as a method of pricing new medicines
and the resulting launch sequencing strategies of manufacturers who launch
products in unregulated or less-regulated markets first.
Fifth, age of a product appears to be an important determinant of drug price
differences. New drugs coming into the market can be considered to be innova-
tive. Clearly, not all new drugs are innovative and the link between ‘new drugs’
and ‘innovative drugs’ is not a linear one, but it is also the case that the perception
Figure 5. Relationship between product age and international price differences in European
Union (EU) countries United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain (EU G5), 2007 prices
Note: Classes of products are listed from left to right taking into account each product’s date of
first introduction within each class.
Source: The authors.
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of innovation varies across settings, particularly that of incremental innovation
and this is often translated in the price premia of such innovations. Figure 5
examines ex-factory drug price differences across EU G5 countries in 2007. There
appears to be a significant link between product age and price differences across
countries. The more recent the market entry is, the smaller are the drug price
differences across countries. For older drugs, prices differ significantly. In addi-
tion, the lowest prices appear to be rising for newer drugs and the highest prices
seem to be decreasing for newer drugs, suggesting an overall price convergence.
4.2 Results of the econometric analysis
Four different specifications are estimated for each of the models shown in
equations (2) and (3). In the first specification age, agesq, generics, xr and the
country dummies are used as explanatory variables. The second specification
also includes therapeutic class dummies. The third specification introduces all
the regulatory dummies (hta, rp, fp and epr) but excludes class dummies, while
the fourth specification includes all explanatory variables.
Results for the model in equation (2), outlining the determinants of public
prices, can be found in Table 3. In the first specification, including only the
effects of age, generic entry and exchange rates as well as country dummies, us,
mex and xr have a positive and statistically significant coefficient at a51%. age
has a negative and significant effect on prices, as expected. The coefficient of
generics is statistically non-significant. When also including therapeutic class
dummies as control variables (Model 2), results are very similar to Model 1. In
the third specification, which introduces policy variables, age has again a
negative effect on public prices (statistically significant at a5 1%). hta has a
negative and significant coefficient: Countries that explicitly use HTA have on
average lower prices by 16.2%, compared with those that do not use HTA. fp
has a positive and significant coefficient: Countries which have free pricing have
on average higher prices by 26.4% (statistically significant at a51%); this
primarily reflects the situation in the United States and Germany. rp and epr are
statistically not significant. The us dummy has a statistically non-significant
coefficient in this model; it is very likely that the us and fp dummies interact in
this case. mex has a positive and significant coefficient, while uk has a negative
and significant coefficient, indicating that when controlling for other factors,
Mexican public prices are on average higher than other countries in the sample,
while UK public prices are lower on average. generics has a positive but sta-
tistically non-significant coefficient. This means that generic presence does not
affect the price of the originator, a phenomenon studied before and known as
the ‘generics paradox’ (Frank and Salkever, 1997). When including both policy
and class dummies (Model 4), results are almost identical to those of Model 3.
The results for a product’s age and generic entry do not change across any of
the four specifications of equation (2), which has public prices as a dependent
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Table 3. Random effects panel data estimation
Dependent variable: PP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
agey 20.032*** 20.031*** 20.027** 20.026**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
agesq 3.09E204 3.00E204 1.71E204 1.64E204
[3.29E204] [3.29E204] [3.26E204] [3.30E204]
generics 20.007 20.007 4.81E204 1.16E204
[0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030]
us 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.031 0.033
[0.044] [0.043] [0.055] [0.054]
uk 20.005 20.005 20.165** 20.164**
[0.044] [0.044] [0.074] [0.073]
mex 0.397*** 0.396*** 0.250*** 0.248***
[0.056] [0.057] [0.065] [0.067]
hta 20.162*** 20.162***
[0.043] [0.042]
rp 0.003 0.003
[0.029] [0.029]
fp 0.264*** 0.264***
[0.050] [0.049]
epr 20.042 20.040
[0.050] [0.050]
xr 20.042 20.043 0.054 0.053
[0.038] [0.038] [0.045] [0.045]
A2B 20.444 20.438
[0.408] [0.427]
C10A 20.714 20.710
[0.530] [0.557]
C8C 21.132** 21.136**
[0.476] [0.502]
C9A 21.718** 21.749**
[0.704] [0.787]
C9C 20.974** 20.981**
[0.411] [0.393]
N2A 0.661 0.659
[0.806] [0.739]
N3A 0.659 0.666*
[0.423] [0.404]
N5A 0.814** 0.813**
[0.356] [0.387]
N6D 0.256 0.260
[0.465] [0.502]
N6A 20.677* 20.671*
[0.388] [0.377]
A10B 20.638 20.621
[0.606] [0.670]
J01 0.823 0.801
[0.511] [0.536]
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Table 3. (Continued)
Dependent variable: PP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R03 20.562 20.551
[0.408] [0.431]
Constant 0.944*** 1.066*** 0.829*** 0.951***
[0.140] [0.236] [0.158] [0.262]
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068
R2 within 0.164 0.164 0.252 0.252
R2 between 0.043 0.431 0.057 0.434
R2 overall 0.059 0.397 0.073 0.411
Wald x2 151.6 206.51 263.4 314.32
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 4. Random effects panel data estimation
Dependent variable: PEF
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
age 20.036*** 20.035*** 20.035*** 20.034***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
agesq 3.88E204 3.81E204 3.07E204 3.01E204
[3.12E204] [3.13E204] [3.12E204] [3.16E204]
generics 20.022 20.022 20.006 20.007
[0.031] [0.031] [0.029] [0.029]
us 0.991*** 0.992*** 0.720*** 0.722***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.054] [0.053]
uk 0.345*** 0.345*** 20.041 20.041
[0.044] [0.043] [0.075] [0.074]
mex 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.03 0.029
[0.058] [0.059] [0.066] [0.067]
hta 20.02 20.02
[0.047] [0.046]
rp 20.018 20.018
[0.027] [0.027]
fp 0.374*** 0.375***
[0.052] [0.051]
epr 0.03 0.031
[0.054] [0.053]
xr 20.228*** 20.229*** 20.032 20.033
[0.039] [0.040] [0.046] [0.046]
A2B 20.455 20.454
[0.429] [0.443]
C10A 20.703 20.704
[0.541] [0.562]
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variable, and are robust, as they do not change when model specifications
change. What does change, however, is the coefficient for prices in the United
States and the United Kingdom when controlling for regulation: us is positive
and significant when excluding policy dummies, and remains positive but
becomes non-significant when including them; this is probably the effect of
interaction between us and fp. uk is negative and non-significant when excluding
policy dummies and becomes negative and significant when including them.
Results for equation (3), having ex-factory prices as a dependent variable, are
shown in Table 4. Model 1 includes only age, generic entry, exchange rates and
country dummies as explanatory variables. Age is negative and statistically
Table 4. (Continued)
Dependent variable: PEF
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
C8C 21.162*** 21.159**
[0.443] [0.459]
C9A 21.704** 21.732**
[0.700] [0.777]
C9C 21.002** 21.011**
[0.425] [0.410]
N2A 0.692 0.685
[0.833] [0.738]
N3A 0.675 0.680*
[0.432] [0.396]
N5A 0.803** 0.789**
[0.371] [0.389]
N6D 0.244 0.236
[0.532] [0.561]
N6A 20.698* 20.696*
[0.412] [0.377]
A10B 20.682 20.676
[0.576] [0.642]
J01 0.848* 0.83
[0.490] [0.509]
R03 20.564 20.559
[0.404] [0.424]
Constant 0.772*** 0.899*** 0.509*** 0.637**
[0.140] [0.240] [0.160] [0.265]
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089
R2 within 0.426 0.426 0.494 0.494
R2 between 0.049 0.435 0.061 0.440
R2 overall 0.120 0.434 0.135 0.449
Wald x2 778.73 878.35 944.64 1011.57
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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significant and generics is non-significant. us, uk and mex are all positive and
statistically significant, indicating that ex-factory prices in these countries are on
average higher than in the other countries in the sample. US, UK and Mexican
ex-factory prices are on average 99.1%, 34.5% and 19.5% higher than other
countries. xr has a negative and statistically significant effect, which reflects the
effect of different currencies and the impact of changes in the exchange rate on
prices. This is also used to control for exchange rate fluctuations, as all prices
have been converted to euros. When including class dummies (Model 2), results
are the same as in Model 1. Policy dummies are introduced in Model 3, where
age continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect. The effect of
generic presence is not significant. The coefficient of us is 0.720 and positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that US ex-factory prices are on average 72%
higher than the other countries in the sample when controlling for the other
variables included in the model. uk and mex are statistically non-significant.
Of the four policy dummies, only fp has a significant effect, suggesting that
countries with free pricing have higher ex-factory prices by 37.4% on average.
xr continues to be negative but is non-significant in this model. Results do not
change in Model 4 (which includes both policy and class dummies) compared
with Model 3.
As in the model depicted in equation (2), results for equation (3) appear to be
robust across different specifications. Results suggest that newer classes of
prescription medicines are more expensive than older classes based on their
respective launch year. This is a finding that is present in all four specifications
for both public and ex-factory prices. Prices in the United States appear to be
higher than in other countries. The effect is not that obvious for public prices,
where the difference can be non-significant and up to 28.8% when significant.
The difference depends on the control variables included in the model. However,
when it comes to ex-factory prices, US prices are between 72% and 99.2%
higher, depending on the control variables included in the model. These results
show that although there are significant price differences between the United
States and other countries when considering ex-factory prices, these differences
are much lower for public prices. Generic presence does not appear to sig-
nificantly affect public prices of originator prescription medicines in any of the
included model specifications.
Finally, Table 5 demonstrates the empirical evidence that emerges from a sub-
sample of the total sample, notably the determinants of public prices in that part of
the sample comprising genericized originator prescription medicines. Product age
continues to have a negative sign and is significant across all specifications,
suggesting that the age of the product still drives prices and price variations
across countries. us is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2, but positive
and non-significant in Models 3 and 4. uk is non-significant, while mex is
positive and significant in all four cases. Free pricing has a positive and sig-
nificant effect and the explicit use of HTA has a negative and significant effect.
358 P A N O S G . K A N A V O S A N D S O T I R I S V A N D O R O S
Table 5. Random effects panel data estimation: off-patent originator drugs facing generic competition
only
Dependent variable: PP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
age 20.041** 20.037* 20.050** 20.046**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
agesq 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
us 0.497*** 0.506*** 0.167 0.173
[0.089] [0.086] [0.110] [0.106]
uk 0.049 0.046 20.213 20.218
[0.082] [0.082] [0.135] [0.133]
mex 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.229* 0.228*
[0.096] [0.100] [0.118] [0.124]
hta 20.162* 20.162*
[0.091] [0.089]
rp 20.003 20.006
[0.055] [0.054]
fp 0.421*** 0.420***
[0.105] [0.105]
epr 0.015 0.014
[0.108] [0.108]
xr 20.056 20.061 0.111 0.108
[0.077] [0.080] [0.083] [0.082]
A2B 20.443 20.416
[0.349] [0.362]
C10A 20.737 20.693
[0.480] [0.477]
C8C 21.258*** 21.195**
[0.472] [0.498]
C9A 21.774** 21.753**
[0.702] [0.798]
C9C 20.874*** 20.807***
[0.313] [0.301]
N2A 0.534 0.538
[0.674] [0.585]
N3A 0.532 0.624
[0.389] [0.437]
N5A 0.694** 0.714*
[0.327] [0.366]
N6D 0.293 0.319
[0.279] [0.306]
N6A 20.849** 20.759**
[0.375] [0.348]
A10B 20.71 20.768
[0.586] [0.603]
J01 0.67 0.722
[0.464] [0.489]
R03 20.564 20.512
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5. Discussion and policy implications
In this paper we have used a representative sample of originator branded pre-
scription medicines to analyze the determinants of their prices and price changes
across 15 OECD countries. Any potential biases occurring due to generic medicines
and formulations and the different dynamics of the generic market, are avoided as
generics are excluded. By using data at two different points in time, further insights
are obtained on how product age, pharmaceutical price regulation and competition
impact on prices of originator (in- and off-patent) branded prescription medicines.
Both ex-factory and public prices are considered in the analysis. The inclusion of
public prices is of great significance, as these are the prices that health insurers or
consumers have to pay; consequently, assessments of affordability and cost con-
tainment unavoidably focus on this particular price.
Important findings have emerged from the analysis presented in this paper. First,
although the price spread in older therapeutic categories used to be significant across
countries, the same spread has narrowed down significantly for newer therapeutic
classes; thus, price convergence is observed over time. Second, cross-country price
comparisons are only meaningful if the right prices are compared in each case.
Therefore, different studies may show different results, if prices across countries are
not selected carefully. In this paper, we have demonstrated how significant price
differences are when ex-factory prices are compared and how these differences
narrow down significantly when public prices are compared across countries. Third,
it seems that price differences between the United States and Europe have been
exaggerated. Indeed US prices are higher than European prices, but not at the extent
that is usually perceived. A very important aspect is that comparison of ex-factory
price differences between United States and Europe can be meaningless as they do
not reflect what health insurers pay in the United States.
Table 5. (Continued)
Dependent variable: PP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
[0.386] [0.385]
Constant 1.008*** 1.143*** 0.862*** 0.976***
[0.203] [0.314] [0.236] [0.324]
Observations 440 440 440 440
R2 within 0.212 0.212 0.325 0.325
R2 between 0.038 0.416 0.041 0.420
R2 overall 0.073 0.400 0.094 0.419
Wald x2 87.45 191.08 143.46 234.92
Robust standard errors in brackets.
**Significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Fourth, cross-country public price differences and cross-country ex-factory
price differences are not the same. This highlights, among other things, the
importance of distribution as a key contributor to public prices of prescription
medicines, by default, as a contributor to the cost incurred by health insurance.
The fact that in many cases distribution margins are regulated and directly (at
times proportionately) linked to the prices of medicines further exacerbates this
situation. Fifth, off-patent originator brands account for a significant proportion
of the price variation between United States and Europe; differences in generic
policies between Europe and the United States and more intensive intervention in
four of the five largest European countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain),
which encompasses originator brands, can explain the significant increase in the
price spread between the United States and Europe (G5). This is also a demon-
stration of the existence of the generics paradox, particularly in the United States,
where prices of off-patent originator brands do not decline post-patent expiry, but,
rather, increase faster than prices of in-patent originator brands. Again, this finding
is a reflection of developments in the study sample between 2004 and 2007 (and
might be the same or different in a wider range of off-patent originator brands),
but is in contrast with developments in public prices of in-patent originator brands,
where differences between the United States and EU G5 are significantly smaller.
Sixth, product age is an important determinant of drug price differences. Newer
products or classes of products are on average higher priced than older (classes of)
products across all settings after having controlled for other factors. This is also
confirmed by other recent work where one of the explanations offered for price
increases is the lack of competition due to lack of therapeutically equivalent drugs
(GAO, 2009). Upward convergence is also observed over time, which can result
partly from explicit use of cross-country price referencing. Seventh, as shown
within the European context, distribution and taxation can contribute significantly
to the total cost of prescription medicines that health insurers pay. This cost varies
widely and relates to significant differences across countries in the rates of payable
VAT (e.g. 19% in Germany vs 2% in France and 0% in the United Kingdom), to
differences in the way the distribution chain is remunerated or/and is allowed to
operate; for instance, there is a fragmented wholesale and retail market structure
with high, but regressive, margins in France and Italy, a less fragmented
wholesale and retail market structure with flat rates in Germany or a liberalized
wholesale and retail market structure in the United Kingdom with extensive
horizontal and vertical integration combined with fixed fees per prescription
dispensed and the opportunity to negotiate prices and discounts with manu-
facturers. Although a detailed discussion of taxation and distribution are outside
the scope of this paper, the above differences are indicative of the reward
structures in the overall pharmaceutical supply chain with analysis conducted
elsewhere (Kanavos et al., 2011b).
The evidence that has emerged from this paper has a number of policy impli-
cations. First, when conducting cross-national comparisons of prescription drug
Determinants of branded prescription medicine prices 361
prices it is important to know what prices are compared and to ensure that such
comparisons use the same denominator across countries. Misperceptions often
occur about price levels across countries, particularly when list prices are confused
with public prices. List prices coincide with public prices in European countries, but
this is not the case in the United States. In this context, price differences between
United States and Europe are not as extensive as originally thought.
Second, it is important to recognize the strategic importance of the compo-
nents of drug prices across countries. One important factor that contributes to
price differences across countries is taxation, through the imposition of a sales
tax or VAT. Different approaches to taxation suggest that there is no economic
rationale for imposing sales taxes or VAT on prescription medicines, other than
taxing resources devoted to the health care budget. A further factor influencing
prices is the contribution of the distribution sector, both wholesale and retail.
Overall, the paper has shown that a significant component of the prices that
health insurers pay relate to taxation and distribution costs and this could result
in resource misallocation. Overall, public prices are totally different from ex-
factory prices and the former reflect the rewards to the entire pharmaceutical
value chain, while the latter are not representative of reality.
Third, the cross-country price spread for newer therapeutic categories or,
indeed, products, is significantly lower than that for older therapeutic categories
or products. As we move towards newer molecules over time by launch date,
there is upward price convergence across the study countries overall. This
is partly explained by external price referencing and the launch sequence for
new products, whereby new products are first launched in less-regulated
countries followed by price-regulated countries. This launch sequence influences
in part the final price in price-regulated countries. In addition, considering that
a significant proportion of the study countries are implementing some form
of regulation on originator drug prices this finding challenges the arguments
that the United States is bearing a significant part of the R&D burden compared
with other regions.
Fourth, the price spread between in-patent originator brands in the sample is
smaller compared with the same spread between off-patent originator brands in
the same sample, both over time and between Europe and the United States; a
significant proportion of the price variation in originator brands across countries
is accounted for by changes in the off-patent originator brand segment; prices in
that segment rise significant in the United States and decline overall in Europe,
confirming the generics paradox in the United States and the associated policy
implications.
Fifth, having controlled for other factors, the statistical significance of product
age suggests that newer medicines or classes of medicines are rewarded with a
premium over older treatments across all settings. Again, this challenges the
argument that if innovation exists in newly introduced treatments, it is poorly
rewarded outside the United States.
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The analysis is not without limitations. First, there is no available data on
advertising, for example in the form of expenditure in detailing, to test its
impact on prices, although a recent systematic review has shown that adver-
tising influences prescribed volume (Spurling et al., 2010). Besides, the inclusion
of the US dummy captures any unexplained heterogeneity surrounding direct to
consumer advertising as this is the only country in the sample where it is
allowed. Second, whereas the sample of products selected has a significant
budget impact and accounts for a significant proportion of total originator
branded prescription pharmaceuticals in the study countries, it may be the case
that outliers may exist in terms of products that are sold in in-patient settings,
which are highly specialized (e.g. vaccines or oncology products) and for which
the pricing arrangements may be different. While this paper explores pricing
determinants in the pharmacy market, an obvious extension would be to study
pricing developments in the in-patient sector. Finally, while we have exhausted
all possibilities to include prices actually paid by health insurance, it is not
possible to account for any hidden rebates given from manufacturers to health
insurers. As the subject matter is originator brand prices, it is thought that the
impact of such rebates is limited.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of prices of originator branded
prescription medicines across different regulatory settings and health care systems,
taking into account their launch date, patent status, market dynamics and the
regulatory context in which they diffuse. Volume-weighted price indices have been
used to analyze price levels for a basket of prescription medicines and their dif-
ferences in 15 OECD countries, the impact of distribution margins and generic
entry on public prices and to what extent innovation, by means of introducing
newer classes of medicines, contributes to price formation across countries.
The evidence shows that differences in ex-factory prices for branded origi-
nator prescription medicines between the United States and other countries,
particularly key European markets, are significant, but these are not the prices
that health insurers pay. By contrast, public price differences have been exag-
gerated and are not as high as originally thought. At public price level, differ-
ences between the United States and other countries, particularly Europe, are
greatest for off-patent originator brands and significantly lower for in-patent
originator brands. Exchange rate movements and volatility can exacerbate such
differences and international comparisons should be treated with caution.
Product age has a significant effect on originator brand prices in all settings after
having controlled for other factors. Price convergence is observed across
countries for newer compared with older originator brands and this could be
partly attributed to the extensive use of external price referencing. Originator
brand prices do not necessarily fall after generic entry and may actually increase,
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a phenomenon known as the ‘generics paradox’ and prevalent chiefly in the
United States. Finally, distribution and taxes are important determinants of
public prices in several of the study countries, having a significant impact on the
cost of prescription medicines to health insurers and affecting the overall payoffs
for the different stakeholders in the pharmaceutical supply chain.
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Appendix
Table A1. Sources of pricing data
Country Data source
Australia Department of Health and Ageing website, http://www1.health.gov.au/pbs
Austria http://oertl.at/ek
Belgium Belgische Centrum voor Farmacothererapeutische Inormatie, 2007,
http://www.bcfi.be
France http://www.vidalip.net
Germany www.rote-liste.de
Greece Greek Ministry of Commerce website, http://www.gge.gr/37/sub.asp?2527
Italy Ministry of Health website, http://www.ministerosalute.it
Japan Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, NHI Price List, 2007
Mexico NADRO (Nacional de Drogas), http://www.nadro.com.mx, May 2007
(Wholesaler ‘Sistema de Precios NADRO’)
Portugal Instituto Nacional de Farmacia e do Medicamento (Infarmed) (2008);
Prontuario Terapeutico on-line, http://www.infarmed.pt/prontuario/index.php
Slovakia Official Ministry of Health list of the Slovak Republic, http://www.mzsr.sk/;
Zoznam lieciv a liekov
Spain http://vademecum.es
Sweden Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency, TLV official price database,
http://www.tlv.se/beslut/sok-i-databasen
United Kingdom MIMS prescribing guide, http://emims.net
United States Price-Chek PCs Program Version 3.12 (Medi-Span, Wolters Kluwer Health Inc.),
http://www.medispan.com/drug-pricing-analysis-pricerx.aspx
Notes: NHI5National Health Insurance; TLV5Tandva˚rds-och La¨kemedelsfo¨rma˚nsverket (Dental and
Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency); MIMS5Monthly Index of Medical Specialties.
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